When Zero is Number One
by John Kleinig
Zadok Perspectives Issue No. 63
Autumn 1999

Part 2

The 'broken windows' theory has garnered its share of advocates and critics over the years, but it would probably not have gained the cachet it has acquired had it not been adopted by William Bratton, who was appointed the New York City Police Commissioner in 1994 (Bratton's close adviser, Jack Maple, sometimes argued that he came to the position independently of his superior).

Beginning in the early '90s, there was a marked decline in serious crime in New York City. Though crime levels across the country were falling, the decline was even steeper in New York as Bratton focussed attention not only on major index crimes, but also sought to apply 'broken windows' theory to the streets. The shift was assisted by the development of a sophisticated computer program called CompStat. This software enabled police to map crime, identify hot spots and hold local commanders accountable for policing their neighbourhoods.

Eventually, the broken windows theory evolved into 'zero tolerance' policing. Behind the moniker lies a proactive style of policing that focuses on 'disorder' as a significant 'gateway' to serious criminal behaviour.

The subway fare-jumper or footpath urinator is not merely arrested but also investigated for other offences. The police claim an impressive tally of knives, guns, outstanding warrants, and so on, from the aggressive policing of these 'quality-of-life offences'. Zero tolerance policing, we are told, gets actual or potential criminals off the streets. Although the decline in serious crime was at the time noted across the nation, the sharper declines registered in cities (long stereotyped as crime-ridden) such as like New York were attributed to the new policing style.

New York became policing's Mecca. British and Australian (among other) police chiefs have flocked to the city to see how zero tolerance works. For its part the NYPD has been only too willing to accept its leadership role.

If there is reason to believe that toleration of 'public disorder' can be clearly linked to 'progressive disorder', in the form of serious crime or as an indicator of more serious criminality on the part of those who engage in it, zero tolerance policing will be socially beneficial. However, critics of zero tolerance policing point to similar initiatives which have failed or, more importantly, have increased alienation between the police and the community they were allegedly serving. For example, British critics frequently refer to the "Swamp 81" initiative that preceded the Brixton Riots in South London ("The Scarman Report: The Brixton Disorders", HMSO, 1981).

Some have also suggested that US crime rates have been influenced equally and perhaps more by stabilisation or closeting of drug markets, the decline of crack-cocaine, changing demographics and improvements in the US economy. Certainly, significant reductions in index crimes have not been confined to New York and cannot be wholly attributable to the NYPD's policing style. Nevertheless, the generally steeper reduction in New York has impressed many as being substantially attributable to the police; if not simply by virtue of their focusing on so-called 'quality-of-life offences', then in conjunction with more sophisticated crime mapping and the greater accountability of area commanders.

So, given its perceived success, why is there a debate about zero tolerance policing? What needs to be investigated is not simply its success in regard to crime, arrests and convictions data, but also the costs associated with that success.

Zero tolerance has been accompanied by a vast increase in complaints against police, a general concern about civil rights and a perceived upsurge in state moralism. And while crime statistics are impressive, New York's policing horror stories reveal zero tolerance's darker side. Abner Louima's brutalisation, Anthony Baez's chokehold death and Amadou Diallo's recent shooting death have merely been deemed the most newsworthy.

Abner Louima was arrested (it appears without good reason) during a disturbance outside a nightclub. On the way back to the stationhouse, the police car in which he travelled stopped twice so that the officers could rain on him a series of blows. At the station house, he was taken into a bathroom stall where the drain plunger handle was forced into his rectum and then his mouth.
In Anthony Baez's case, after a football from a street game hit a police car, an officer arrested him using an outlawed chokehold and Baez, an asthmatic, collapsed and died. Amadou Diallo was cut down by a special anti-crime unit in a hail of-wait for it-41 shots as he stood unarmed in the lobby of his building.

All the victims were black; the police were white.

John Kleinig John Kleinig is the Director of the Institute for Criminal Justice Ethics and Professor of Philosophy in the Department of Law & Police Science at John Jay College, City University of New York. He is also a founding member of the Zadok Institute.