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Conference Excerpt
by McKenzie Wark
Zadok Perspectives Issue No. 62
Spring/Summer 1998/1999
Part 2
Frank Brennan argues that
non-believers "in the public domain
refrain from gratuitous aspersions such as the description of the Roman
Catholic Church as an ossified institution. Unless church people abuse
their public trust, they are as entitled as anyone else in the public
domain to civic courtesy." That's a vain hope, I'm afraid. But more
to the point, not defensible as a matter of ethical principle. It is an
honestly held proposition to many secularists that the churches are ossified
institutions and impediments to reason. We must be as free to talk believers
out of their loyalty to their churches as the churches are free to talk
people into belonging to them.
Everyone wants terms of debate in the republic that suit them, but the
republic is all about difference. There can be no agreement in advance
about the rules of debate any more than there can be agreement in advance
about the outcome of the debate. The rules themselves are always up for
debate as well, and not always politely.
What matters, I think, is that people who have strongly held ethical beliefs
about the desirability of a particular outcome need to coordinate their
approach to public debate. A good example, I think, was the problem of
justice for Aboriginal people on the native title issue. Many people agree
in broad terms on a desired outcome who have very different reasons for
arriving at a shared conclusion. People who, on other matters, may disagree
very strongly.
Native Title strikes me as an issue that bears out the postmodern approach
to ethical thinking, in that it is not only the outcomes sought by the
parties that are incompatible, so too are the criteria each side proposes
for judging the merits of the case.
Environmental protection also has this incommensurable quality. It's a
classic example of what Jean François Lyotard calls a difference.
The terms proposed by the rival parties are such that they exclude the
possibility of the other's case being heard. Argued in ecological terms,
there is no argument for development that reduces biodiversity. Argued
in economic terms, the quantification of the environment is not only arbitrary,
it puts it on a par with other quantified resources, and permits trade-offs
between that which destroys the very value of what ecologists seek to
preserve.
One could go on multiplying cases, but it seems to me that this is how
the res publica usually works. Incompatible aims, argued in incompatible
terms confront each other and seek a public adjudication on a case by
case basis, whether it's what secularists may say about believers or what
pastoralists may do on land subject to native title or what ecologists
may preserve of resources others want to develop.
Not all differences, however, have to lead to division. Difference can
be the very principle that connects us together. This might appear at
the moment as a fashionably postmodern idea, but in my book The Virtual
Republic (Allen & Unwin, 1997) I made some effort to trace it back
through Hannah Arendt, David Hume and Machiavelli to classical sources.
To approach it just from Hume's point of view-he argued that we belong
neither to a unifying spiritual community nor to an atomised war of all
against all; rather, we experience the world from the point of view of
the immediate pack, clan or family grouping to which we most immediately
belong. We are bound, he says, to our fellow gang or family members by
sympathy.
The point of the institutions of civility, among which Hume counted public
conversation, is to extend our sympathy, by artificial means, to people
even more different to us than our immediate associates. The institutions
of civility extend sympathy to wider and wider circles, always incompletely.
What's important about this idea, I think, is that it doesn't require
the suspension of difference in the process of extending sympathy. Sympathy
is the extension of feeling to what is different, not the rendering of
it as the same.
To: Part
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McKenzie Wark
McKenzie Wark is lecturer in Media Studies at Macquarie University
and author of Virtual Geography (Indiana University Press, 1994)
and The Virtual Republic (Allen & Unwin, 1997). This is an edited
version of his address, "Justice and Entitlement in the Republic
of God", given at Zadok's 1998 Biennial Conference.
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