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Zadok Paper S95 Autumn 1998
Ethics and the Adversary System
by Ken J. Crispin
A consequentialist model
A consequentialist paradigm for legal
ethics need not consist of a utilitarian quest for some simplistic conception
of the greater good, such as the greatest number of just decisions or
the greatest number of satisfied litigants. The concept is sufficiently
wide to permit due consideration of the demands of role morality and other
moral claims for partisanship and zealous advocacy.
In the context of legal professional advocacy, a suitable paradigm might
involve acceptance of a number of propositions. First, the adversary system,
for all its deficiencies, is a valid means of resolving disputes and pursuing
truth and justice, albeit imperfectly. Its retention is warranted by the
considerations discussed earlier. Secondly, if it is to be maintained,
then lawyers must fulfil at least the minimum which their representative
roles require. Thirdly, those roles require at least some measure of partisanship.
Fourthly, if "common morality" is taken to focus only on the
precise act in question and ignore systemic considerations then, as Parker
concludes, there will always be circumstances in which lawyers are required
to behave in ways which run counter to common morality. Hence, any search
for a single, all embracing principle that would reconcile the claims
of role morality and common morality is doomed to failure.73 Fifthly,
the demands of role morality must nonetheless be tempered to some extent
by those of common morality.
Such a conception would require some modification of the professional
codes. They would generally accept the standard conception of the advocate's
role but provide scope for greater personal discretion. Some rules could
remain in absolute terms. For example, it would be difficult to imagine
circumstances in which the rule requiring the disclosure of relevant previous
decisions would be changed. Others would need to be redrafted as 'rebuttable
presumptions' or 'prima facie duties' so that, while the general principle
would be affirmed, lawyers would have a discretion to depart from it if
confronted by a situation which they believed gave rise to an overriding
ethical demand. It would rather depend upon the more pragmatic consideration
that the harm caused by adherence to the general rule in the particular
situation with which the lawyer is faced might outweigh the considerations
which favour adherence to the rule.
To: Preserving
morality and client loyalty
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Ken Crispin QC, who was for 25 years
a barrister, is currently a Judge of the Supreme Court and is Chairman
of the ACT Law Reform Commission. This paper draws on his P.h.D.
thesis, entitled "Ethics and the Advocate".
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