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Zadok Paper S95 Autumn 1998
Ethics and the Adversary System
by Ken J. Crispin
Christian influence and ambivalence
In earlier years such questions were readily
answered. Legal ethics like legal principles were based largely on biblical
precepts. St Paul appeared to invest secular authorities with the role
of being God's agents of punishment.18 The oath was important because
it exposed perjurers to divine punishment while proof by ordeal involved
an appeal by the participating priests for God to reveal the truth.19
Similarly, the Norman innovation of trial by battle was based upon the
assumption that God would determine the judgment.20 The peine forte et
dure (literally, "severe and hard punishment", to enable a confession)
was also seen in terms of its religious implications. For example, a report
of the case against the hapless Robert le Ewer in 1322 notes that even
if the accused was pressed to death this was "healthy for the soul,
provided he bore it with resignation".21 The newly emerging system
of justice based upon trial by jury naturally absorbed this religious
ethos.
The Christian Church fathers, notably Augustine of Hippo and Thomas Aquinas,
had a significant impact on naturalist legal theory stressing that temporal
law, or lex humana as Aquinas described it, is subordinate to the eternal
law of God.22 The earliest English lawyers were also churchmen and the
early writings on the common law all had a strong religious flavour.23
Blackstone, in his famed commentaries, conceded the supremacy of "divine
law".24 Lawyers were enjoined to find their professional duty within
the context of Christian morality. Even the renowned Erskine, in the course
of prosecuting the publishers of Paine's Age of Reason, was heard to say:
"The people of England are a religious people and, with the blessing
of God, so far as it is in my power, I will lend my aid to keep them so."25
Lord Eldon went further, actually proclaiming that "Christianity
is part of the law of England".26
The concept of role morality became increasingly difficult to accommodate
within existing dogma and advocates were exhorted to follow proper moral
standards. Thomas Aquinas had written that an advocate who defended an
unjust cause unknowingly "is excused according to the measure in
which ignorance is excusable" but that he who knowingly defended
an unjust cause "sins grievously".27 St Germain cautioned that
an advocate "may give no counsel (saving his oath) neither against
the law of God nor the law of reason",28 while John Cook added the
necessary sanction: "to speak well in a bad cause is but to goe to
Hell . . ."29 Others, such as Thomas Arnold plainly concluded that
advocacy was simply an immoral calling. In 1840 he wrote to a former pupil
who had obviously flirted with a legal career:
Your letter gave me such a deep and lively pleasure that I could scarcely
restrain my joy within decent bounds, for to see any man whom I thoroughly
value delivered from the snare of the Law as a profession is, with me,
a matter of the most earnest rejoicing . . . so I should rejoice in your
escape whilst it is yet time, and following the right hand path to any
pure and Christian calling which, to my mind, that of an advocate, according
to the common practice of the Bar, cannot be, and I think that scarcely
any practice could make it such . . . for advocacy does seem to me inconsistent
with the strong perception of truth and to be absolutely intolerable,
unless the mind sits loose, as it were, from any conclusions, and merely
loves the exercise of making anything wear the semblance of truth which
it chooses for the time being to patronise".30
Despite such abjurations barristers remained acutely conscious of the
Christian mores of the times and their speeches reflected an acceptance
of the fact that all involved in the legal process were ultimately accountable
to God. Of course, individual lawyers may still be guided by religious
conviction but in a modern pluralistic society biblical authority no longer
determines the formulation of ethical standards by the profession as a
whole.31 What then is to fill the void?
To: The
hope of moral philosophy
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Ken Crispin QC, who was for 25 years
a barrister, is currently a Judge of the Supreme Court and is Chairman
of the ACT Law Reform Commission. This paper draws on his P.h.D.
thesis, entitled "Ethics and the Advocate".
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